Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

State of Utah v. Lee Allen Aase : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; attorney for respondent.
Randine R. Salerno; attorney for defendant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Aase, No. 870276 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/506

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^

UTAH COURT OF APPfAl*
BRIEF
^ ^

E
JMENT
K. »J
SO
.A10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOCKET NO. J16ZJU-

CA

STATE OF UTAH

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
LEE ALLEN AASE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870276-CA
Before Judges: Garff,
Billings and Greenwood.

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING FROM A DECISION RENDERED
ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1988, AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE HONORABLE RODNEY 0. PAGE.

David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 533-7661

Randine R. Salerno
Attorney for Defendant Appellant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 621-5820

p. • <Ju L-i
GO'Jr.'

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
LEE ALLEN AASE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870276-CA
Before Judges: Garff,
Billings and Greenwood.

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING FROM A DECISION RENDERED
ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1988, AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE HONORABLE RODNEY 0. PAGE,

David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 533-7661

Randine R. Salerno
Attorney for Defendant Appellant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 621-5820

TABLE OP CONTENTS
BASIS OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

ADDENDUM
MINUTE ENTRIES

1

JUROR AFFIDAVIT

5

-i-

TABLE OP AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Bundy v. Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) . . . 4
Deats v. Commercial Security, 746 P.2d, 1191 (Utah App. 1987) . 8
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983)

8

Hillier v. Lamborne, 740 P.2nd, 300, 304 (Utah App. 1987). . 8, 9
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). . .3, 4
Pritcher v. Dept. of Employment Security, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 20,
23 (1988)
9
Simpson v. General Motors, 24 Utah 2d, 301, 303, 470, P.2d 399,
401 (1970)

4

State v. Morgan, 23 U. 214 (1900)
State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983)

-ii-

5, 6, 9
4

STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES
(Please see Addendum)

Rule 35, Rules Of The Utah Court Of Appeals, effective April 10,
1987
1
Rule 59(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

9

Section 12, Article 1, Utah Constitution

6,9

Section 11, Article 1, Utah Constitution

7

UCA §77-17-11 (1982)

2, 3, 9

UCA §76-5-203 and §76-4-101 (1978 and supp. 1987)(R.60-64). . . 2
§§113, 115, 307, Bishop on Criminal Procedure

6

ADDENDUM
MINUTE ENTRIES

1

JUROR AFFIDAVIT

5

-iii-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

: PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

vs.

:

LEE ALLEN AASE,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

: Case No. 870276-CA
Before Judges: Garff,
: Billings and Greenwood.

BASIS OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is confired upon this Court
pursuant to Rule 35, Rules Of The Utah Court Of Appeals,
effective April 10, 1987.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant-Appellant requests a Re-Hearing from a
decision rendered on the 14th day of October, 1988, affirming a
jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted criminal homicide,
rendered on the 11th day of May, 1987, in the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Rodney 0. Page presiding.

Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice

Of Appeal with the Utah Court Of Appeals on July 10, 1987. The
Court rendered its decision with regards to the above-entitled
matter on the 14th day of October, 1988.
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STATEMENT OF THB ISSUE
1.

The Court of Appeals made an erroneous determination

as to the Defendant-Appellant's claim that he is entitled to a
new trial because the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch,
during its deliberations, without an officer sworn to keep them
together as required by §77-17-11, Utah Code Annotated (1982).
STATEMENT OF THB CASE
Defendant, LEE ALLEN AASE, was charged with attempted
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under §§76-5-203
and 76-4-101, Utah Code Annotated (1978 and supp. 1987)(R.60-64).
The Utah Court Of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an opinion
rendered on the 14th day of October, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues raised by the Defendant-Appellant on the
Petition For Re-Hearing generally do not require a resistation of
facts beyond that contained in the Statement of Facts in his
Appeal.

However, Defendant-Appellant brings to the Court's

attention that after the Defendant-Appellant had rested his case
at trial, and after the parties had concluded their closing
arguments, and after the bailiff had been sworn to take custody of
the jury for its deliberations, and without knowledge of defense,
the jury, during its deliberations, was permitted to recess for
lunch prior to the rendering of its verdict.

T.T. Vol. Ill,

Page 78 and Pages 4 and 5 of the Addendum, Minute Entry of May 11,
1988, and the Juror's Affidavit attached hereto.

-2-

Further, the

Defendant did not discover the impropriety alleged herein until
after he had been sentenced and his Notice Of Appeal filed with
the Court.

It was the Defendant-Appellant's understanding that

jurisdiction had transfered to the Utah Court Of Appeals prior to
his discovery of

reversible error.

could have been made

Therefore, no objection

to the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE AN ERRONEOUS DETERMINATION
AS TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE JURY WAS PERMITTED TO ADJOURN FOR LUNCH,
DURING ITS DELIBERATIONS, WITHOUT AN OFFICER SWORN TO KEEP THEM
TOGETHER AS REQUIRED BY §77-17-11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1982).
In affirming Defendant-Appellant's conviction, this
Court held that the issue as to whether Aase is entitled to a new
trial because the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch during
its deliberations without an officer sworn to keep them together
could not be raised for the first time on appeal because it was
not raised before the trial Court.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d

799, 801 (Utah Court. App. 1987) has been cited as the
controlling authority.

Apparently in support of its decision not

to consider the question arising from the alleged irregularity
in the District Court proceedings, this Court incorrectly stated,
at page 6 of the Opinion, that "the record on appeal contains no
indication that the unescorted lunch occured".
Clearly the principle that matters not raised in the
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may not be raised for the
first time on appeal promotes the prompt and efficient
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administration of justice.

As the Court stated in Bundy v.

Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), citing Simpson
v

- General Motors, 24 Utah 2d, 301,303,470, P.2d 399, 401 (1970).
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose in the
final settlement of controversies, requires that
a party must present his entire case and his theory
or theories of recovery to the trial Court; and
having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some
different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion
a merry-go-round litigation.

See also James v. Preston, Supra @ P.50.
This rule cannot, however, operate to effectively
eliminate constitutional as well as statutary protections
guaranteed to criminal defendants, especially where the Defendant
harmed as a result of the violation has no notice of the
violation and logically, therefore, has no opportunity to object.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "exceptional
circumstances " may arise requiring a review of matters raised
for the first time on Appeal.
254 (Utah 1983).

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252,

Here, the exceptional circumstances are that

neither Defendant nor his attorneys knew of the unescorted lunch
until jurisdiction had been transfered to the Court of Appeals.
If the Defendant and his attorneys had been appraised of the
unescorted lunch, or even the possibility thereof, they would
have made their objection clear to the trial judge.

It should

not be presumed that any attorney defending a prisoner charged
with a felony crime would permit this type of irregularity
without objection.
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In State v. Morgan, 23 U. 214 (1900), James Morgan was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in July,
1899.

His conviction was affirmed on Appeal and remanded for an

Order requiring execution of the death penalty.

After the case

had been remanded to District Court, a Motion was filed
requesting a new trial on grounds that he had recently discovered
that jurors had responded falsely to voir dire questions
concerning any bias they may have had towards Morgan prior to his
trial on the matter.

The declarations of the jurors, as set out

in Affidavits, were unknown to either the Defendant or his
attorneys until July 26, 1900, 24 days after the District Court
had entered a new Order to execute Morgan pursuant to the remand.
The Motion was denied and this Appeal followed.
In vacating the judgment and granting Morgan a new
trial, the Court articulated several principles of law which are
intregal parts of the foundation upon which our criminal justice
system has been built and exists today.

At the forefront is the

principle that a "Defendant on trial for felony is entitled to
all the protections which (a) statute intends to secure..."

Id.

@ P. 224. The proposition which necessarily goes hand in hand
with that fundamental principle is that "The (Supreme) Court is
constituted to enforce legal rights and redress legal wrongs, and
whenever it is made to appear, as it is in this case, that a
wrong has been perpetrated, it does not hesitate to exercise the
power with which it has, unless to do so would do a greater
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injury than to refuse to exercise it."

Id. @ P. 231.

In Morgan, the State had argued that a new trial could
not be had because the rules did not provide grounds upon which
to base the Motion and because the Motion had not been made
timely.

But the Court responded by pointing to §12, Article 1 of

the Utah Constitution guaranteeing the right of an accused in a
criminal case to have a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury
and the right to Appeal in all cases.

The Court pointed out that

"when a wrong is the violation of constitutional rights the
legislature has no power to prohibit or substantially impair
(the) remedies." Id. @ P. 228. Justice Hart, writing for the
majority, went on to point out that
In the absence of any legislative remedy for such
wrongs, the Courts will resort to the common law
if it affords a remedy, and if it does not, then
the Courts, by virtue of their inherent power, and
their duty in criminal cases to guard the rights of
the persons will, if possible, devise new remedies,
as has been done from a very remote period of time,
by equity Courts, to meet new conditions and supply
remedies for wrongs, when none already existed...
(For) a right of which the person can not avail
himself is practically no right. (Bishop on Criminal
Procedure, §§113, 115, 307).
Id @ P. 228, 229.
During the course of a criminal prosecution, the accused
has an absolute right to an impartial jury.

In conjunction

therewith, he has a right, and the Court has a responsibility to
ensure, that whenever there is communication with the jury during
its deliberations, the accused will be present.
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For how can he

exercise any right if he is not permitted to participate in all
proceedings which may well result in his loss of liberty or life.
The Court's communication with the jury during its deliberations
on May 11, 1987, were ex parte. Neither Defendant nor his
attorneys were present.

Moreover, the unescorted lunch was not

discovered until long after judgment had been entered.

This

Court had a duty on Appeal to review the Bailiff's Affidavit and
the record and to fashion a remedy for Appellant.

Anything less

deprives Appellant of his Constitutional right to Appeal.

Please

see attached, Addendum at P. 5, the Juror's Affidavit.
There can be no rule depriving an accused of due process
or equal protection of the law simply because a violation thereof
goes undiscovered for a period of time subsequent to his trial on
the matter.

Indeed, §11, Article 1 of the Constitution of the

State of Utah specifically provides that "All Courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law..."

To say that Appellant has no remedy for the violation of

law requiring an officer to keep his jury together, safe and
private during deliberations and guaranteeing an impartial jury
is to say that he has no right to have these protections.
cannot be the result this Court intended.

This

As Justice Greenwood

stated in her opinion, at page 6, "if the jurors were, indeed,
allowed to go to lunch at a public restaurant, unescorted by the
bailiff, the statute was clearly violated."
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The record does disclose that the jury was excused for
lunch during its deliberations.

Neither the Defendant-Appellant

nor his trial attorneys were present when the trial judge called
the jury into the courtroom during deliberation and excused them
for lunch.

The minute entry of May 11, 1987 states, under no

uncertain terms, that the bailiff was sworn and the jury excused
for deliberations at 11:50 a.m..

Sometime between 11:50 a.m. and

3:35 p.m., when they returned to find the Defendant guilty, they
were "returned to the courtroom and excused for lunch."

Addendum

@ Pages 4 and 5 (T.T. Vol. 3 @ Pg. 82). The bailiff did not go
with them nor did he keep them private and together.

Because the

trial took place in a small community involving a high profile
local crime, prejudice must to be presumed.
This Court has refused to consider the Bailiff's
Affidavit attached to Appellant's Reply Brief in a consideration
of Appellant's arguments on Appeal even given the unusual manner
with which the jury was handled during its deliberations.

To

hold that this Affidavit does not fit within a well-defined rule
governing submission of jury affidavits on appeal misses the
point.

Appellant understands that juror Affidavits are generally

inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict with two exceptions:
"1) When the verdict was determined by chance or bribery,
U.R.C.P. 59(a)(2); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah
1983); Peats v. Commercial Security, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App.
1987); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304 (Utah App. 1987); or
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2) to establish

"whether extraneous prejudicial information was

improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to hear upon any juror."
Hillier, 740 P.2d @ 305; Utah R. Evid. 606(b).

Pritcher v.

Department of Employment Security, 80 Utah Adv. Rep 20, 23
(1988).

The Appellant, however, does not challenge the conduct

of the jury, nor does Appellant question the process by which the
jury reached its verdict.

Appellant challenges the irregularity

in the proceedings which deprived him of a safe and private jury.
Appellant further challenges the Order of the trial Court
permitting the jury to be excused for lunch, unescorted, as an
abuse of discretion which prevented him from having a fair trial.
Rule 59(a)(1), Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure.

In this respect

the underlying policy of preventing attempts to undermine the
integrity of verdicts which limits the availability of Affidavits
on Appeal does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this
case.

To hold otherwise would deny Appellant his right to Appeal

the trial Court's Order permitting the jury an unescorted lunch
in violation of Section 12, Article 1, Utah Constitution and
§77-17-11, Utah Code Annotated.
The Court has held strong fast to the proposition that
the right to Appeal is a fundamental right.
Supra.

State v. Morgan,

It would be unconsicionable, given the facts and

circumstances of this case, for the Court to refuse to consider
the unescorted lunch and all of its ramifications.
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Appellant

requests that this Court remand this case to the District Court
for a new trial.
DATED this *2 ?**" day of October, 1988.

RANDINE SALERNO
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to: David L. Wilkinson, Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah on this
J?X

day of October, 1988.
.<->£ ,.

/*£<-

RANDINE SALERNO
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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ADDENDUM

jriainun

Date

vs.

5514
Case No.

LEE ALLEN AASE

RODNEY S. PAGE, Judge

Defendant

Hal Rees, Reporter
Leslie Snow, Clerk

This is the time set for jury trial.

The State is

represented by William McGuire and J. Mark Andrus.

The defendant

is present and represented by Randine Salerno and Kevin Sullivan.
A jury is impaneled.

Those chosen to serve are as follows:

Michael J. Logan
Dan R. Eastman
Claudia J. Seifert
Terri M. Brown
Lynn K. Porter
The Information is read aloud

Julie Nisbet
Gary E. Hogge
M. Jolene Potter
Marjorie E. Newson
by the Clerk.

Preliminary instructions are given by the Court to the jury.
Exclusionary Rule is invoked.

Opening statements are given by

counsel.
Court is adjourned for lunch and is resumed in session.
Counsel and Court are in chambers along with the defendant and
Larry Lewis who is representing KSL TV.

Court will allow still

pictures in the courtroom on the condition that no pictures are
taken of the jury or with any member of the jury in view.

There

will be one photographer allowed and he is to confine himself to

FILVIHD
Bountiful, Utah

WBDADOH, P e t ^ r X , .
C^fttQgvi11P, Utah »

Uu
rsan

-SWAPP, Holly
- Bountifuli Utnh-

m> *r &
POTTER, M. Jolene
Bountiful, Utah
-1-

offered and received.
Dan Jones is sworn and testifies*

Exhibits K, RR, S, H, I

J, 0, P, Q, R, SS, T are offered and received.
William Holthaus is sworn and testifies.

Exhibits E, U, V,

X, TT, W, ZZ, BB, & CC are offered and received.
Gary Briant is sworn and testifies.

Exhibit FF is offered

and received.
David Kennepohl is recalled and testifies.

Exhibit PP is

offered and received.
Reed Mecham is sworn and testifies.
William Holthaus is recalled and testifies.
Dick Martin is sworn and testifies.

Court will adjourn for

the evening.
May 8, 1987
Court is resumed in session.

Parties and counsel are

present, jury is present and accounted for.
Dick Martin resumes the stand and is admonished that he is
still under oath.

Exhibits 1, JJ, KK, LL, MM, & NN are offered

and received.
Court meets in chambers with counsel and defendant.
Testimony is proffered by the State regarding the testimony of
Idaho police officers who stopped the defendant some time in 1985
and found he was carrying a gun loaded with snakeshot and
hollowpoint rounds.

WHllADON, Tetcr T£„»
C&itorvi 11 P , Utah ^

Court finds that because of the length of

LU

LL.
.SSAPP-r-STtsan '
B«Hmiiu'jL.uii,--irE5h

Bountiful,

Utah

'9WAFP, H o l l y —
- DQuni-ifuli Utnh-

m ** A

POTTER, M. Jolene
Bountiful, Utah

-2-

outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Court is resumed in session. Michael Stewart is sworn and
testifies.
Raymond Cooper is sworn and testifies. Exhibit HH is
offered and received.
Steve Major is sworn and testifies.
Court is adjourned for lunch and is resumed in session.
Mitchell Brock is sworn and testifies.
Danny Glover is sworn and testifies.
LaVee DeGarlis is sworn and testifies.
Craig Shaw is sworn and testifies.
Larry Gaines is sworn and testifies.
David Brazil is sowrn and testifies.
Ina Ray Ance is sworn and testifies. Exhibits II, 00 & UU
are offered and received.
State rests.
Court is in chambers. Defense moves for directive verdict.
Court finds that the jury could believe all of the inferences and
if they did, there is sufficient evidence to take the matter to
the jury and the motion is denied.
Sheila Rowland is sworn and testifies.
Gloria Walters is sworn and testifies.
Gary Jenkins is sworn and testifies.
Court is adjourned for the evening.
May 11, 1987
This is the time set for continued trial. Counsel and
defendant are present, the jury is present and accounted for.

Bountiful, Utah
^

Cghtorvi U P , Utah >

u.
EehLiuii'iy Lun;

fft

•swArr, Holly Bountiful; Utah-

urah
-3-

14% **~ &

Court gives jury mstrucrionb. ^uuaooo. ^--^
arguments. Ms. Seifert is excused as alternate juror.
Bailiff is sworn and jury is excused for deliberation at
11:50 a.m.
Jury is returned to the courtroom and is excused for lunch,
They are present and accounted for an continue deliberation.
Jury is returned at 3:35 p.m. and find the defendant guilty of
Attempted Criminal Homicide. Defendant is referred to AP&P for
pre-sentence investigation and sentence is set for June 9, 1987
at 1:30 p.m. Jury is polled. Jury is excused and court is
adjourned.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT

:

vs.

:

LEE ALLEN AASE,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

: Case No. 870276-CA
Before Judges: Garff,
: Billings and Greenwood.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF DAVIS)
COMES NOW, JULIE NISBET, of Bountiful, Utah, State of
Utah, County of Davis, and after having been duly sworn, deposes
and affirms under oath as follows:
1.

That I am JULIE NISBET and am your affiant herein.

2.

That I was called to jury duty and sat as a juror

during the trial of Lee Allen Aase in May of 1987. I
participated in deliberations with regards to the criminal
charges that were filed against Mr. Aase.
3.

That on the 11th day of May, 1987, the last day of

Mr. Aase's trial, and during the period of time that we were
deliberating concerning evidence presented during Mr. Aase's
trial, we were released by the Court to go to lunch. Myself,
along with two or three other juror's, went across the street to
a public restaurant and ate. We returned back to the courtroom
-5-

JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT
State vs. Aase
Case No. 870276-CA
Page Two

at approximately 1:30 p.m. as we had been instructed by the
Court.
DATED this 26th day of October, 1988.

IE
JtfrLIE

NISflET,
NISBET, Ju
Juror

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 26th day of
October, 1988.
NOTARY fiUBLIC
RESIDING IN: Ogden, Utah
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 1-06-92
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Rebuttal Argument on Question Presented:
I.

T H E COURT OF APPEALS RETAINED JURISDICTION TO
CONSIDER PETITIONER ARCHER'S APPEAL WHERE ARCHER
FILED HIS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL,
Clark's initial argument in his brief seems to confuse the issue currently

pending before this Court. Clark argues that a lack of filing a writ of certiorari after
the denial of the petition for interlocutory appeal, this Court now lacks jurisdiction to
hear Archer's appeal on the case in its entirety. However, the Court specifically
placed at issue only one question for this briefing:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider Petitioner's appeal and that Petitioner had waived the
opportunity to challenge the propriety of a rule 54(b) certification in
connection with his appeal.
Thus, Clark's argument fully misses the point. The question is whether the Court of
Appeals retained jurisdiction due to the fact that Archer timely filed a notice of appeal
after the trial court erroneously certified its judgment as "final". Archer argues that,
due to the Court's decision in Cedar Surgery Center. L.L.C. v. Bonelli 2004 UT 58, 96
P.3d 911 (Utah 2004), Archer preserved his appellate right by filing his petition for
interlocutory appeal. As Archer properly filed his Notice of Appeal, the Court of
Appeals maintained jurisdiction to hear this appeal in its entirety.
The petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed under the restraints of
both Utah R. App. P. 4 and 5. Clark argues that Archer missed the 20-day deadline

1

under Rule 5. However, as the Index to the Court Record indicates, the "Notice of
Entry of Final Judgment on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action" was filed on March
17, 2008. The Notice of Filing of Petition for Appeal was filed on April 7,2008. This
is twenty-one days after the entry of the trial court's order. However, the twentieth
day after entry was Sunday, March 16,2008. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 22, if the
final day of a period of time to file a document is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday,
the period extends to the following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
Archer timely filed his notice of appeal under each of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The Court of Appeals' underlying denial of Archer's appeal is based on Lindsey
v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co.. 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995). In its decision, the Court
of Appeals erroneously determined claim that Defendant Archer had failed to file an
appeal of the trial court's decision. The entirety of the case law surrounding the point
of law relied upon in Lindsey also rests on the premise that the party seeking appeal at
the end of the case had failed to file an appeal of the order within the time frame
allowed by Rule at the issuance of the trial court's decision. In this case, however,
Defendant Archer did file a timely appeal of the decision. According to this Court's
ruling in Cedar Surgical Center LLC. Defendant Archer's Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal was sufficient to preserve Archer's appeal rights regardless of whether the
54(b) certification was proper.

2

Further, as demonstrated in the opening brief, the time for appeal of an
improper Rule 54(b) certification does not start until all issues have been resolved at
the trial level In re Integra Realty Resources. Inc.. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Or. 2001);
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. 919 F.2d 1230,1237 (7th Or. 1990), modified on other
grounds, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Or. 1992), reversed on other grounds, 113 S. Ct 2606
(1993). Therefore, even where Archer did not file a petition for writ of certiorariwith
regard to the Court of Appeals' denial of Archer's petition for Interlocutory Appeal,
where the Rule 54(b) certification is improper, the time to file an appeal did not begin
to run until all matters before the trial court were resolved.
Accordingly, Defendant Archer's appeal of the district court's Rule 54(b)
certification, was not untimely.
II.

ARCHER PRESERVED HIS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE T H E

COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO D E N Y T H E APPEAL O N
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES.
Clark argues that Archer failed to raise his argument under Cedar Surgery
Center v. BoneliL until Archer's opening brief and therefore Archer has waived his
ability to raise this argument. In fact, in Archer's Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Archer stated as follows:
The Court of Appeals, in its February 20, 2009 dismissal of Defendant
Archer's appeal, stated that Defendant Archer had failed to timely file an
appeal from the trial court's erroneously certified order. In fact, on
March 31, 2008, Defendant Archer did appeal the trial court's order.
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Defendant Archer sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal on
the matter.
Archer did not cite to Cedar Surgery Center. LLC v. BonellL but the argument
was presented. Further, this Court specifically directed the parties to address the issue
regarding whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Archer's appeal. Nothing in the two footnotes cited by Clark prohibits putting
before this Court new case law to support an appellant's argument. The first case
cited by Clark stated that because the party had not stated the issue in its petition for
review. Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest. 2004 UT
104 flO, 106 P.3d 700, 702 n.2 (Utah 2004). In the instant case, however, Archer did
preserve the issue in his petition for certiorari.
Clark then cites to Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands &
Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 a l l (Utah 1996). In Trail Mountain, the Court took
issue with an issue that was raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief.
Archer has not waited until this Reply Brief to raise this issue. Archer preserved the
issue in the Petition for Certiorari and fleshed the issue out in his Opening Brief.
Archer has not waived his right to now be heard by this Court on whether the
interlocutory appeal constituted sufficient notice to preserve his appellate rights under
the Bonelli case.
Archer properly preserved this issue on appeal through his Docketing
Statement and Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Further, the Court has specifically asked
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the parties to address the issue with whether the Court of Appeals had erred in
claiming that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This issue is fleshed out more
specifically by Archer in his Opening Brief Archer has properly raised the argument
on the issue currently before this Court.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURTS 54(to CERTIFICATION OF T H E RULING
O N T H E SECOND A N D N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION WAS
IMPROPER AS T H E STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN A N D
T H E FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS BETWEEN T H E SECOND A N D
N I N T H CAUSES OF ACTION OVERLAPPED WITH T H E
REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION.
Clark raises three points in his argument that the trial court properly decided

and certified the second and ninth causes of action in Clark's amended complaint.
Archer does not dispute the first issue raised by Clark, that the amended complaint
involved both multiple claims and multiple parties.
The second issued raised, however, does present a problem with Clark's
argument. The trial court based its decision on Clark's claim that the warranty deed
had not been legally "delivered" to Archer. Clark's citation to the tidal court's order,
however, fails to mention that Clark failed to bring his action until after the statute of
limitations had expired on his cause of action. The trial court was unable to reach the
merits of Clark's claim for failure of delivery without resolving the fact that Clark's
claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court stated
5

The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely and
viable today as well. The timeliness of this cause of action was the issue
addressed by the supplemental briefing of the parties as requested by the
Court. The second cause of action for failure of delivery remains timely
based on the content of Archer's Affidavit Originally, the Court was
focused on the principle or doctrine of the discovery rule in relationship
to the application of the statue of limitations to the second cause of
action of the amended complaint. However, the Court need not rely
upon or analyze the application of the discovery rule because of the
content of Archer's Affidavit.
R. 460.
The trial court relied on an affidavit filed by Archer in the trial court after Clark
had commenced the action as the reaffirmation of a debt that extended the statute of
limitations under Utah Code Annotated §78B-2-113(l)(b). What the trial court failed
to consider is that the terms of U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)1 only apply where the
affirmation of an outstanding debt comes within the timeframe for bringing an action
on that outstanding debt. State Bank v. Troy Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah
App. 1995). In this case, where the affidavit came after the statute of limitations had
run on the underlying cause of action, Archer's affidavit could not be used to act as a
reaffirmation of any debt. Troy Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d at 1276. Therefore, regardless
of whether delivery of the deed was effective, the entire matter was improperly before
the trial court as the statute of limitations had expired.

1

U.C.A. §78B-2-113(l)(b)states in relevant part: Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of limitations from the date:
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the debtor,
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Clark's final point, that the trial court's ruling met the requirement of "finality"
necessary to allow the court to certify the issue for appeal under Rule 54(b), fails to
counter the arguments raised by Archer in his Opening Brief. Specifically, Archer
points to the argument and citations presented to the Court on pages 1 2 - 1 7 . In that
discussion, Archer demonstrates that the trial court's certification was improper. The
factual issues the trial court attempted to resolve in its ruling overlapped with the
factual issues of the remaining causes of action.
As demonstrated in Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R.. 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997),
Clark's second cause of action contained factual overlap with the remaining causes of
action. A successful appeal by Archer on this one cause of action will allow Clark to
return to the trial court in an attempt to regain possession of the land through another
cause of action raised in his amended complaint. The appeal of the trial court's Rule
54(b) certified cause of action would, therefore result in a piecemeal appeal. This is
precisely what this Court has sought to avoid throughout the cases that have been
brought under a Rule 54(b) certification. Id. at 597. Accordingly, Clark's argument
on finality fails to meet the three-prong test for certification to be proper under Rule
54(b).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, along with the reasons stated in his Opening

Brief, Archer respectfully requests that this Court determine that the Court of Appeals
did have jurisdiction to hear Archer's appeal on the issues raised at the trial court.
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Respectfully submitted this 15* day of January 2009
B. Ray Zoll,

icah Bruner,
Counsel for Appellant/Defendant Archer
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